This time last year, as I mentioned at the time, we decided to try an experiment. In past few years, EDN had published my retrospectives on the prior year first, followed by my forecasts for the year to come roughly one month later. While, as I noted, the cadence might make conceptual sense—reviewing and learning from the past before portending what’s to come tends to work out best, after all, in the spirit of “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it”—from a practical standpoint it was non-ideal, due to the non-zero delay between when I submitted a writeup and when, roughly a month later in most circumstances, it got published. In 2021, for example, my past-year retrospective appeared on the EDN website on December 9, but due to publishing lead times, I’d submitted it two weeks prior and more than a month before the year’s end, on November 27, 2021. A lot can happen in a month-plus!

Last year, in contrast, I submitted my year-ahead forecast in late November, with the retrospective following it. While this still means that “a lot can happen in a month-plus”, especially in these seemingly increasingly crazy times, any latency impact would instead affect my future insights, which are already inherently imperfect (I know how shocked you all are to hear that my crystal ball is indeed perpetually murky). My look back at the past year, on the other hand, was more comprehensive than it had been before, thanks to the ordering flip-flop. And so, we’re continuing with the updated cadence again this year. Without further ado…

(Increasingly) unpredictable geopolitical tensions

As with my yearly Holiday Shopping Guides, I try to not repeat themes in either these or my retrospectives from one year to another. But it would be negligent of me to not do so in this case, as not only have last year’s noted conflicts continued, but they’ve also been joined by at least one notable other.

Europe first. As I write these words in early November, we’re a week shy of 600 days and a month since Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2002. By the time you read these words, we’ll likely be drawing ever closer to the two-year mark, and with no definitive end in sight. What was initially forecasted by many to end up as a rapid Ukrainian collapse has turned out to be anything but that, thanks to the invaded country’s population’s resilience, determination, and inventiveness, along with Western allies’ financial aid, armament and other assistance.

As with other topics I’ll explore in this piece, I’m not going to (publicly, at least) take sides in this conflict. What I will say is that the battle lines have largely stagnated of late, with technology in a variety of forms likely what’ll be necessary to jump-start Ukraine’s counterattack progress again, as it faces a much larger foe. Ironically, no less an expert on such matters than Valery Zaluzhny, the commander-in-chief of Ukraine’s armed forces, opined at length on this particular topic in a guest piece in The Economist just a week ago. I highly recommend his words and their associated experience and insights as well worth your perusal time and attention.

Next: Asia. The tensions between China and Taiwan (and their effects not only on both sides but the world at large), which I wrote about at length a year ago, have largely remained on “slow burn”. That said, there have been plenty of added confrontations not only between them but also between China and other players in the region, such as the Philippines and United States. Again, I’ll publicly keep my opinions to myself, with the exception of noting that the potential impact to the semiconductor and broader technology industry (not to mention the even broader world economy) of a China invasion of Taiwan would be catastrophic and long-lasting.

Last but definitely not least: the Middle East. On October 7, Hamas militants, numbering as many as 1,000 according to some estimates, launched a surprise attack on southern Israel across the Gaza Strip border, killing more than 1,400 people, taking more than 200 hostages and reigniting longstanding, long-simmering conflict in the region. As I write these words, the Israeli military response is underway, after a multi-week delay intended to (among other things) allow time for non-combatant Palestinians to flee the northern section of the Gaza Strip where Hamas is centralized, albeit still resulting in a significant loss of civilian life along with even more sizeable population injury and displacement. Clashes between Israel and Lebanon-based Hezbollah at Israel’s northern border are also ramping up, threatening to create a two-front war.

Once again, I offer no public opinion on any of this. That said, there’s widespread debate and concern (as with Ukraine and Taiwan) as to whether this conflict will spread beyond an existing existential threat to the state of Israel, to the Palestinian peoples in the Gaza Strip and West Bank, and to Israel’s neighbor countries. The bigger-picture threat is a further expansion to a regional or even worldwide conflict. Consider, for example, that Hamas and Hezbollah are two of the many proxy militias of Iran, who is allied with Russia, China, N. Korea, and others. Note, too, Israel’s alliances with the United States and other Western countries. Even in its current form, this conflict is having a deleterious economic effect on Israel, a technology powerhouse particularly when assessed on a per capita basis. And I doubt I need to remind any of you of the sizeable percentage of the world’s oil production that comes from the Middle East, and of the worldwide economic impact were that petrochemical flow to abruptly decrease or even cease.

Note that in reference to the topic of this section (as well as the next one, for that matter), I’m not going to attempt to hazard a guess as to how the situations in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East (and anywhere else where conflict might flare up between now and the end of 2023, for that matter) will play out in the year to come. My intent is solely to note that regardless of the outcomes in all of these cases, they’ll have notable influence the technology sector in myriad ways.

The 2024 United States election

Americans are accused (at least sometimes rightly, IMHO) of inappropriately acting as if their country and its citizens are the “center of the world”. That said, the United States’ policies, economy, events, and trends inarguably do notably affect those of its allies, foes and other countries and entities, as well as the world at large, which is why I’m including this particular entry in my list. It’s particularly timely considering that the third Republican Party presidential primary debate, which did not include the current polling-claimed frontrunner (by several dozen percentage points, no less) for the nomination, was just a couple of nights back as I write this.

That Republican frontrunner is, of course, the former President, Donald Trump, who’s currently 77 years old and will be 78 next November 5, election day in the United States. Trump is currently facing 91 indictments in four separate felony cases, two state (New York and Georgia) and two federal, all currently scheduled to go to trial before election day. Trump’s business enterprise is also currently on trial for civil charges in New York, and a defamation lawsuit from earlier this year has just been re-opened to consider additional penalties resulting from his post-initial judgement statements and actions.

The current Democratic frontrunner, and the current president, Joe Biden, is a week and a few days away from turning 81 as I write these words. If he succeeds in being re-inaugurated on January 20, 2025, he’ll be 82 at the time. Biden’s current low polling performance comes, so say the pundits, in part from voters’ concerns about his age and its effect on his mental acuity (concerns that also plague his leading opponent) and physical robustness. Policy concerns are also a factor, specifically regarding sizeable government subsidies and lingering inflation, no matter that data suggests that the U.S. economy has exited the pandemic in comparatively solid shape. And in addition to whoever the Democratic and Republican nominees end up being, increasing numbers of third party (both potential and already active) and unaffiliated candidates further muddy the already cloudy waters of who’ll be the victor a year from now.

that latter “policy” point, this is more than just a big-picture tug-of-war between “small” and “big” government advocates (not that either major political party even fits neatly into either of those buckets anymore). Trump, for example, aspires to fundamentally transform the U.S. government if he and his allies return to power in the executive branch, moves which would undoubtedly also have myriad impacts big and small on technology and broader economies around the world. Who ends up in power a year from now, not only in the presidency but also controlling both branches of Congress, and not only at the federal but also states’ levels, will heavily influence other issues already discussed here, such as support (or not) for Ukraine, Taiwan, and Israel, and sanctions and other policies against Russia and China.

Note once again that I have not (and will not) reveal personal opinions on any of this, nor will I be forecasting what I think the election outcomes will be. That said, you’re welcome to sound off (civilly and respectfully, please!) with your thoughts in the comments!

Windows (and Linux) on Arm

After two big-picture topics, these last three will be more focused (and hopefully also less controversial). As long-time readers may recall, I’ve been on-and-off using Arm-based Windows computers for nearly a decade now, beginning with the first-generation Surface with Windows RT. More recently, I acquired a first-generation Surface Pro X in mid-2021 (which I’m typing on as I “speak”, in fact). Although initial impressions were underwhelming due to a dearth of native app support (along with other programs that flat-out refused to run even x86-emulated), the release a few months ago of a full-featured Dropbox client has significantly transformed my opinion of the platform for the better, both generally because Dropbox is my “cloud” repository of choice and specifically because that’s where my 1Password database is housed.

Granted, this system isn’t a “screamer” from a performance standpoint, but that’s not why I bought it. All I needed was something to handle various “office” application functions, including email, while being thin and light and delivering long battery life. The Surface Pro X’s integrated cellular connectivity also often comes in handy. And any performance detriment with this particular system implementation isn’t endemic to the entire product category, as Apple’s three generations’ worth of Arm-based SoC families and systems based on them clearly exemplifies.

To wit, Qualcomm has to date released three generations’ worth of its own Arm-based and Microsoft-destined SQ-series SoCs (my Surface Pro X contains the first-generation SQ1), along with additional mobile computing-tailored Snapdragon application processors for other OEM customers. The company is also already showing off its next-generation Snapdragon Elite X, destined for production availability in system form mid-next year. Claimed competition is also looming on the horizon in the form of Arm-based chips from first-time entrant AMD and re-entrant NVIDIA (the Surface with Windows RT I mentioned earlier was also NVIDIA-based), a rumor that when released resulted in a dip in Intel’s stock price. But speaking of which, Intel isn’t standing still either, as its recently announced Meteor Lake mobile processors exemplify.

So, what do you think, readers? Will Windows- and Linux-on-Arm, in linking arms with their MacOS-on-Arm siblings, end up being a serious threat to the longstanding x86 hegemony? Why or why not? And if yes: in what market segments (mobile, desktop, server, multiple), and when? Again, let me know your thoughts in the comments.

Declining smartphone demand

Stating the likely already obvious, smartphones have for many years been a notable recipient of the semiconductor output of captive fabs and foundries all over the world—application processors, cellular modems, DRAM, flash memory, image sensors, displays, and the like. So when I read that smartphone sales are down by a significant degree of late versus historical norms (with the notable exception of my particular product family platform, interestingly), and particularly when the trend is more than a one-quarter negative “blip”, it grabs my attention.

What’s going on here? (At least) three things that I see. For one, the historical frustrating software-induced “obsolescence by design” trend is, at least for the moment, thankfully running in reverse. My Pixel phones are case study examples of this recent OEM “enlightenment”. Until the Pixel 6, software updates were only guaranteed for three years post-introduction. With the Pixel 6 and 7 families, this extended to five years for bug fixes and the like, albeit still only three years for primary operating system upgrades. And with the newly launched Pixel 8 successors, it’s seven years for all software, intra- and inter-operating system versions alike.

Hardware is also getting increasingly durable, thanks to added and beefed-up features such as water and dust exposure tolerance and crack-resistant displays. The result? The refurbished phone market is booming, as consumers upgrade from their existing phones to newer, but still previously used by others, successors. Of course, the decreasing effectiveness of “free new phone” promotions from cellular carriers might also have something to do with it, as consumers increasingly wise up to the reality that the phones aren’t actually “free” at all, but instead are paid for by installment plans baked into the monthly service bills…

That all said, none of this would be particularly impactful on new phone demand if new phones came equipped with new features deemed compelling by consumers. Alas, that particular temptation seems to be decreasingly effective, too. Once your existing phone has two rear-camera lenses, or even just one really good one, do you really need three? Is a gram or so of weight saved by moving from aluminum to titanium really still enough motivation to crack open the wallet for another $1,000-or-so purchase? And just how “retina” does a display really need to be before you can’t tell the difference between it and what’s currently in your pocket?

Internal and external interface evolutions

Last but not least, I’d like to say a few words about buses. No, not the transportation kind of bus, unless of course we’re talking about transporting data bits across interfaces, in which case…yep, those. Internal first. PCI Express (PCIe) is increasingly dominant not only in computers but also in embedded systems that leverage the same fundamental silicon building blocks. Plus, PCIe forms the technology foundation of spinoff interfaces such as the CFExpress card.

Today’s mainstream deployed PCIe variant is Gen4 (aka, 4.0), whose public unveil was more than a decade ago, believe it or not, in November 2011 (the spec was finalized in mid-2017). Its successor, Gen5 (5.0), whose spec was finalized in 2019 and which is now beginning to show up in leading-edge PCs, doubles the PCIe Gen4 bandwidth, from 31.5 GBytes/s in each direction for a 16-lane configuration to 63 GBytes/sec bidirectional.

Who needs all that speed? Good question. Graphics cards, arguably, although all but the highest end PCIe Gen4 ones available today benchmark comparably even when plugged into a backwards-compatible PCIe Gen3 slot, begging the question of what additional benefit a PCIe Gen5 successor might deliver. And SSDs, again arguably, although less so, particularly given that the M.2, U.2 and other to-system interfaces are narrower in terms of the number of parallel lanes than what’s typically found with full-size add-in cards. Still, benchmarking of initial PCIe Gen5 SSDs versus high-end Gen4 predecessors reveals only modest improvements, and then only when sequentially reading and (especially) writing short sequences of data to and from the DRAM cache onboard the flash memory module. And the incremental power draw demanded by the newer SSDs is definitely not modest. That said, PCIe Gen5 capabilities both at the system and peripheral level are forecasted to ramp into fuller production volume beginning in 2024.

nd what about external interfaces? I’m talking here, in today terms, specifically about Thunderbolt 3, Thunderbolt 4, USB 3.x and USB 4. Explaining the differences between them (including scenarios when TB3 might actually perform better than its TB4 successor) is beyond the wordcount-and-other scope of this summary, although I intend to dive into detail on the topic in a dedicated writeup next year. Also to be included in it is what’s motivating the mention here: Thunderbolt 5, which Intel officially unveiled back in September.

Unlike with the Thunderbolt 3-to-4 generational transition, which maintained the same 40 Gbps bidirectional bandwidth albeit adding USB 4 compatibility and other implementation tweaks, Thunderbolt 5 marks a return to the bandwidth doubling of prior generational transitions, now 80 Gbps in each direction. Plus, a dynamically configurable feature called Bandwidth Boost allows for three of the four Thunderbolt lanes to optionally transport traffic in one direction (120 Gbps, with 40 Gbps in the other direction), supporting ultra-high resolution, ultra-high frame rate displays, for example. Still, I wonder when (if at all) mainstream applications and the hardware they run on will beg for this much speed (and low accompanying latency), considering the potential power, cost, and other tradeoffs necessary to deliver it. We’ll supposedly find out soon enough; per Intel’s release, “Computers and accessories based on Intel’s Thunderbolt 5 controller, code-named Barlow Ridge, are expected to be available starting in 2024.”

By: DocMemory
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